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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KRISTI A.
DAVIS,
Plaintiffs, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellees
Case No. 940443-CA

vs,
U.S. BANCORP MORTGAGE COMPANY,
formerly U.S. BANCORP REAL ESTATE
SERVICES, formerly U.S. THRIFT
& LOAN; and H. CLYDE DAVIS,

Priority No. 2
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellant
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE PROPERLY PRESENTED THE EVIDENCE
IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Appellees

contend

in

Point

I of

their

brief

that

the

Plaintiffs failed to submit the evidence relied upon to refute
the

motion

for

summary

judgment

at

the

trial

court

level

(Appellee's brief at 15-18).
As demonstrated hereinafter, all of the facts relied upon by
the Plaintiffs were a part of the Record at the time the trial
court rendered its decision in this case.
set out

in the

Statement

of

Facts

All of the facts, as

in Appellants' brief

are

referenced to specific entries in the Record in this case.
Although an Appellant is precluded from raising new evidence
on appeal, the Appellant is certainly free to argue all of the
evidence

in

the

Record

at

the

time

the motion

judgment was decided by the trial court judge.
Court in Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P. 2d 943 n. 4

for

summary

As noted by the
(Utah Ct. App.

1994), the appellate court has an obligation and responsibility
to "review a trial court's grant of summary judgment using only
the information on file at the time the trial court granted the
motion."
The Court in Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650
(Utah 1994), clearly identified the process in reviewing a motion
for summary judgment as follows:
Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the
pleadings to determine whether a material issue of
facts exists that must be resolved by the fact
finder [citing cases].

In accordance with this

rule, "the party moving for summary judgment must
establish a right to judgment based on the applicable
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of
fact.

A party opposing a motion is required only

to show that there is a material issue of fact.
[Emphasis in the original] [citing

cases]....

accordingly, because this is an appeal from a
summary judgment, we review the factual submissions
to the trial court in a light most favorable to
finding a material issue of fact, [citing cases].
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis
of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could
differ on any material issue [citing cases].
Id.

See also Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982).
The Appellee

fails to cite one factual issue asserted on
2

appeal that was not included in the Record at the time Judge
Burningham heard arguments on the motion for summary judgment.
As demonstrated hereinafter, all of the facts asserted by the
Appellants

were

contained

in

the

pleadings,

affidavits

and

depositions relied upon by the parties at the trial level.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF ANTICIPATORY
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
A.

The Elements of Anticipatory Breach of Contract.

In the Appellants' original
anticipatory breach is recited.

brief,

the

law

relating

to

An anticipatory breach occurs

when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and
unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed
for performance is due.

Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d

86 (Utah 1992); Hurwitz v. David K. Richards, Co., 20 Utah *2d
232, 234-235, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968).
Utah

case

law

establishes

that

the

other

party

can

immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach, or it
can

continue

to

treat

the

contract

waiving

any

as

right

operable
to

sue

and

urge

for

that

performance

without

repudiation.

Kasco Services Corp, supra, United California Bank

v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ariz. Ct.
App.

1983); See also, University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp.,

504 P. 2d 29, 39 (Utah 1972).

As noted by the Court in Breuer-

Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah Ct. App. 1990):
A party that has received a definite repudiation from
the breaching party to the contract should not be

3

penalized for its efforts to encourage the breaching
party to perform its end of the bargain.
The Appellees do not challenge the Appellants' statement of
the law relating to the elements of anticipatory breach or the
rights that an anticipatory breach creates in the non-breaching
party (Appellees' brief at 23).
B.

There are Disputed Issues of Material Fact Relating to
the Anticipatory Breach of Contract by the Defendant.

Appellees

totally

misconstrue

the

importance

existence of anticipatory breach in this case.

of

the

The Appellees

simply argue that:
Anticipatory breach is not a cause of action but
rather is a legal ground for the non-breaching party
to make an election . . .

a separate claim for an

anticipatory breach is meaningless.
Appellees' brief at 23.
The importance of the anticipatory breach cause of action is
that a finding by the fact finder that Defendants breached the
agreement

would

have

exempted

the Plaintiffs

from making

any

further payments under the agreement and would have precluded the
Defendants from foreclosing on the contract.
It should be noted that the Appellees do not address any of
the factual issues raised by the Appellants with regard to the
issue of anticipatory breach (Appellees' brief at 23).
In

summary,

the

payment

ledger,

Addendum

No.

2

to

Appellants' original brief, demonstrates that after the credit
line was opened on July 7, 1986 there were wide fluctuations in
4

the balance of the $50,000.00 line of credit.

The Plaintiffs

withdrew significant amounts and likewise made payments of over
$32,000.00

(R. 140-142, Addendum No. 2 to Appellants1

original

brief).
The facts establish that the Plaintiffs continued to make
payments on the loan up to June of 1991 (R. 140-142, Addendum No.
2 to Appellants' original brief).
On July 7, 1991, Mr. Chris Wold, the loan officer for the
Defendants wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs requiring

monthly

payments for the months of June, July and August of 1991 and then
payment in full of the credit line by August 27, 1991 (R. 139).
The Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis testified that he had two
conversations with Mr. Wold in person in which Mr. Wold "promised
to reopen

[the] credit line and allow

[Davis] to use it upon

payment of . . . $19,000.00 (Steven C. Davis deposition at 58-59,
Addendum

No. 5 to Appellants' original

brief).

Further, in

Steven C. Davis's affidavit of January 9, 1993, Mr. Davis stated:
2.

On or about June 17, 1991, a management employee of

Defendant, Chris Wold, indicated to myself and
Defendant Clyde Davis that if a pay down on the
credit line was made in the amount of nineteen thousand
dollars

($19,000.00),

that

the

credit

line

would

Chris

Wold,

remain open and available for use.
3.

Based

defendant

upon

the

representation

Clyde Davis paid

of

down the credit

line on

order that I could go back to school and would be able
5

to keep the account current by making payments on the
credit line from the available balance.
R. 19-20.
The Defendant, H. Clyde Davis, testified in his deposition
and affidavit that Chris Wold told him that if the Plaintiffs
would pay the $20,000.00, the credit line would be reopened and
would be available
deposition

at

for use by the Plaintiffs

22-23,

26-29,

Addendum

No.

(H. Clyde Davis

6 to

Appellants'

original brief).
Amazingly,
Defendants
"interest
remained

Chris

Wold,

acknowledged

in

his

by

the

that if the $20,000.00 were paid

and

only" payments were made
current, the credit

affidavit

and

if the

filed

first

mortgage

line could be paid off within a

"reasonable period of time" and that "U.S. Bancorp would
with' the Davis . . . ."
The

Record

$20,000.00

(R. at 80-81).

is clear

payment,

'work

the

that

after

Defendants

the

Plaintiffs made

refused

to

allow

the
the

Plaintiffs to withdraw any monies from the credit line.
The facts outlined above establish an anticipatory breach
of contract in that Mr. Wold refused to extend the line of credit
even though the Plaintiffs had paid the required $20,000.00.

No

one disputes that Wold's action in refusing to open the line of
credit

constitutes

"a positive

render performance."

and unequivocal

intent not to

Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d

794, 796 (Utah 1968).
The Plaintiffs' position is that they were entitled, upon
6

the anticipatory breach by the Defendants, to refuse to make any
further

payments

anticipatory

on

breach

the
by

credit

the

line.

Defendants

Additionally,
would

the

preclude

the

Defendants from using the Plaintiffs' failure to pay as a basis
to foreclose on the credit line.
The Plaintiffs 1

theory

is that an agreement was reached

with Mr. Wold, an agent of the Defendants, that if the Plaintiffs
paid the required $20,000.00, the credit line would remain open,
allowing the Plaintiffs to access the same for any use, including
obtaining money to make temporary payments to the Defendants.
The

Plaintiffs

demonstrate

an

contend

anticipatory

that

the

breach.

facts
Upon

outlined

the

above

anticipatory

repudiation of the contract, the Plaintiffs could treat the same
as a breach
payment.

and be excused

from

any

further

performance

Kasco Services Corp., v. Benson, 831 P.2d

1992); See Appellants' original brief at 14.

86

or

(Utah

Contrary to the

assertion to the Defendants on appeal, a finding of anticipatory
breach by the trial court would have precluded summary judgment
and

constituted

a defense

to the

foreclosure

action by

the

Defendants.

Utah case law established that a party to a contract

can

willful

not

by

act

or

omission

make

it

impossible

or

difficult for another to perform and then invoke the others nonperformance as a breach. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P. 2d 140 (Utah
1982);

Reed

v. Alvey,

610 P.2d

1374

(Utah

1980);

Ferris v.

Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Weber Meadow-View Corp. v.
Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978).

7

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
A.

Elements of Breach of Contract.

The Appellees do not dispute the elements of a cause of
action based upon breach of contract set out in the Appellants1
original

brief

(Appellants' original

brief

at 23, Appellees'

brief at 24).
B. There are Disputed Issues of Material Fact Relating to
the Plaintiffs' Claim of Breach of Contract.
The

Defendants

do

not

contest

the

assertion

of

the

Plaintiffs that the Record in this case clearly establishes a
claim for breach of contract.

Although the Ninth Cause of Action

of Plaintiffs' compliant is captioned "Breach of Fiduciary Duty,"
the

Appellees

do

not

contest

that

the

cause

of

action

substantively identifies the elements of a cause of action for
breach of contract.

In fact, Appellees state:

Appellants' arguments in support of their Ninth Cause
of Action might otherwise be well and good, except that
that action was dismissed by stipulation of the parties
in open court.

The order granting

summary

judgment

dismisses the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and
Eighth Causes of Action, and then states:

"Inasmuch as

plaintiffs' other causes of action have already been
dismissed

by

stipulation

and

order,

plaintiffs'

complaint is now fully dismissed with prejudice."
Appellees' brief at 24.
The

Record

in this case

relating

8

to the hearing

on the

motion for summary judgment consists of a Minute Entry and the
Order prepared by counsel for the Defendants.

The

Minute Entry

dated the same day as the argument, January 3, 1994 fails to
recite any stipulation relating to the voluntary
any

of

the

causes

of

action

contained

in

the

dismissal of
Plaintiffs'

complaint (R. 446-447).
In the Order prepared by counsel for the Defendants there is
one sentence, contained in the recitals of the Order that relates
to the alleged stipulation.
in the

substantive

The recital language is not included

portion of

the Order.

The one

sentence

recites:
Inasmuch as plaintiffs1 other causes of action have
already been dismissed by stipulation and order,
plaintiffs' Complaint is now fully dismissed with
prejudice.
R. 552, Addendum No. 1 hereto.
A review of the entire Record in this case fails to produce
any stipulation and order relating to the dismissal of the Ninth
Cause of Action.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs neither stipulated

to the dismissal of the Cause of Action in open court nor signed
any stipulation or order relating thereto.
Rule 41(a)(1) is explicit:
. . . an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary

9

judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who appeared in the action
. . . . (Emphasis added).
Rule

4-504(3) of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Administration

recites that:
Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for
signature within 15 days of the settlement and
dismissal.
The facts of this case establish that no stipulation was
prepared,
relating

signed
to

or delivered

a proposed

to the court.

stipulation

The one

is contained

only

phrase
in the

recitals to the order granting summary judgment and was not part
of the substantive order.
ineffective
existent

inasmuch

stipulation.

Additionally, a Court Order would be

as the dismissal
The Appellees

was based upon
argue

further

a non-

that

the

Appellants failed to establish a material issue of fact relating
to damages (Appellees' brief at 24).
the

extensive

relating

to

Defendants do not dispute

factual outline of the disputed
the

Plaintiffs 1

claim

of

issues of

breach

of

fact

contract

(Appellants' brief at 23-27).
There

is

simply

no

question

that

the

Plaintiffs

established a prima facie case of breach of contract.
evidence

in the

light most

favorable

to the

have

Taking the

Plaintiffs, the

Defendant was obligated to allow the Plaintiffs access to the
credit line after the $20,000.00 was paid.
10

The failure to allow

that access caused the Plaintiffs failure to make the required
monthly payments and inability to prevent the foreclosure.

As a

result, the Defendant was allowed to foreclose on the Plaintiffs1
home and property and the Plaintiffs were denied their rights
under the credit line agreement.
Equally clear is the prima facie case of the Defendant's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith dealing.

Mr. Wold

failed to create a document memorializing the conditions attached
to the $20,000.00 payment.

That failure is especially crucial in

that Mr. Wold's own affidavit recognized that he had agreed to
forego foreclosure and allow the Plaintiffs a "reasonable time"
in which to pay off the loan.

Under those conditions, a lending

institution clearly has a duty to document the transaction to
prevent any misunderstanding.

Additionally, the failure of Mr.

Wold to send a letter to the Plaintiffs outlining his position
before commencing

foreclosure and setting the matter

constitutes egregious conduct.

for sale

Granting the Defendant the right

to commence foreclosure certainly constituted significant damage
for which the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
The Plaintiffs right to recover special damages is discussed
hereinafter.

For purposes of the breach of contract cause of

action, the wrongful commencement of foreclosure proceedings and
denial

of

constitute

the

right

sufficient

to

access

damage

to

the

remaining

avoid

the

entry

credit
of

judgment.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION
11

line

summary

BASED ON ESTOPPEL,
A.

Elements of Estoppel.

The Appellees
estoppel

do not

dispute

(Appellees' brief at 21).

the

elements

of

equitable

The elements essential to

invoke equitable estoppel are (1) a statement, admission, act, or
failure to act by one party that is inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party

taken

on

the

basis

of

the

first

party's

statement,

admission, act, or failure to act; and, (3) injury to the second
party

that

contradict

would
or

result

repudiate

from
such

allowing
statement,

the

first

party

admission,

to

act, or

failure to act. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d
671

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists,

Inc. , 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity Club, Inc. v.
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Utah
Dep't of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d
270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
B.

The Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of
Estoppel.

The Appellees do not dispute that the basis the trial judge
used in granting summary judgment on the estoppel issue is as
follows:
. . . Although the plaintiffs presented evidence
about their understanding of what would happen after
making a $19,000.00 payment to U.S. Bancorp, there
was no evidence presented as to any actual statement
made by an employee of U.S. Bancorp that mislead the
12

plaintiffs and/or Clyde Davis.

Based on the lack of

competent evidence to prove any erroneous statement,
the Court need not address the issue of damages.
R. 551.
The Defendants apparently do not dispute that the Plaintiffs
have created a factual issue with regard to equitable estoppel.
The Defendants do not dispute that Chris Wold, as an agent of the
Defendants, represented that the Plaintiffs would have no problem
withdrawing further funds from the credit line in order to go to
school if the $20,000.00 payment was made (R. 48, R. 19-20, 7984;

Steven

C. Davis

deposition

Appellants' original brief).

at

58-59, Addendum

No. 5 to

Obviously the facts establish that

the Plaintiffs relied upon the statement made by Wold by making
the $20,000.00 payment.

As a result, the Plaintiffs were forced

to take out other loans (R. 45), suffered through post-traumatic
stress

syndrome

(Response

to

Interrogatory

No. 7 ) , suffered

through damaged relations with neighbors, suffered disruption of
family life and incurred other losses (Response to Interrogatory
No. 7 ) .
The Defendants argue that estoppel must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence and that the burden of proof has some
bearing on these proceedings (Appellees1 brief at 21).

However,

Utah law is clear that:
.as to questions

concerning

material

issues of

fact, "affidavits and depositions submitted in support
of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
13

may be used only to determine whither a material issue
of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's
case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely
to succeed in a trial on the merits."
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); See also Ron
Shepherd Insurance v. Shields, supra.

As clearly indicated by

the case law, the issue on appeal is whether a material issue of
fact exists and not whether or not the burden of persuasion has
been met.
Secondly,
relating

to

Appellees

estoppel

are

argue

that

barred

by

the
the

Plaintiffs'
Statute

of

claims
Frauds

(Appellees' brief at 22).
The claim of the Appellees fails in two regards.

First, the

Plaintiffs have a cause of action based upon the clear language
of

the

original

Disclosure
brief).

U.S.

(R. 75-78,

Creditline
Addendum

Revolving

Creditline

and

No. 1 to Appellants' original

Under the terms of the agreement the Defendants had an

obligation "so long as [the] account is not cancelled, you are
not in default, or there has not been any material adverse change
in your

financial condition,

[to] lend you money according to

this account . . » . (R. 75-78).

As indicated in the Statement

of Facts of Appellants' original brief, timely payments were made
by the Plaintiffs up to the time that Mr. Wold wrote his letter
to the Plaintiffs dated July 7, 1991 demanding that the note be
paid off in its entirety by August 27, 1991 (R. 139).
Secondly, the Plaintiffs are not relying exclusively upon
14

oral modifications to the original agreement.

Mr. Wold's letter

of July 7, 1991 deviates from the stated conditions of the credit
line agreement.
that

the

Further, Mr. Wold, in his affidavit acknowledges

$20,000.00

payment

entitled

the

Plaintiffs

to

a

reasonable period of time to resolve the matter (R. at 80-81).
In summary, the Plaintiffs are not trying to establish an
independent

agreement with the Defendants.

Rather, the issue

relates to a determination of the Plaintiffs1 rights

under the

terms of the credit line agreement once the $20,000.00 payment
was

made.

That

issue

must

be

resolved

by

looking

to

the

agreement and the conversation and dealings between the parties.
Utah

Code

Annotated

25-5-4(6)

(1989

as Amended),

prohibits

enforcement of credit agreements that are not founded in writing.
However, the use of parol
dealing

between

parties

evidence to establish

on

a credit

line

a course of

agreement

is not

prohibited by the explicit language of the Statute of Frauds.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION BASED
UPON MISREPRESENTATION.
A.

Elements of the Misrepresentation Cause of Action.

The Appellees do not contest the elements of a cause of
action

for

original

Misrepresentation

brief

as outlined

(Appellees' brief

at

in the Appellants'

20).

The

Elements

of

Misrepresentation are:
(1)
(2)

That a representation was made;
concerning

a presently

existing

fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
15

material

representor either (a) knew to be false or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact
rely upon it; (a) and was thereby induced to
act (9) to his injury and damage.
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d

573, 577

Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d

(Utah Ct. App.

1993);

992, 994 (Utah 1992);

Wright v. Westside Nurseiy, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990);
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (Utah 1952).
B.

The Plaintiffs have Established a Prima Facie Case of
Misrepresentation Which Should have Precluded the Entry
of Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiffs, in their Statement of Facts clearly outline
material issues of fact relating to the Misrepresentation Cause
of

Action.

The Appellees

cite

favorable

portions

from

the

depositions of Steve Davis and Clyde Davis and then state that
"misrepresentation

must

be

proved

by

clear

and

convincing

evidence" (Appellees' brief at 18-29).
However, as indicated repeatedly herein, the issue on this
appeal relates to the existence of material issues of fact and
not a weighing process involving the determination of which party
is more

persuasive.

Webster

v.

Insurance v. Shields, supra.
16

Sill,

supra;

Ron

Shepherd

There is ample evidence that the Defendant's agent, Chris
Wold made an explicit representation to the Plaintiffs regarding
the credit line agreement.

In summary, Chris Wold represented

that U.S. Bancorp would not take any further action with regard
to the alleged negative amortization of the first mortgage as
long as the Plaintiffs paid a $19,000.00 payment and two payments
of

$500.00

to

be

applied

to

regular

monthly

payments.

In

addition, Mr. Wold represented that the available credit, up to
$50,000.00
schooling

would

be

available

to the

Plaintiffs

to

finance

and meet their other monthly expenses including

monthly obligations owing to U.S. Bancorp.

the

That representation

made by Mr. Wold concerned a presently existing material of fact.
The representations of Mr. Wold were no doubt false in that
the Defendants instituted a foreclosure action.

The fact finder

could easily determine that Mr. Wold made the representation to
the Plaintiffs in order to induce the Plaintiffs in to making the
$20,000.00 payment and reducing the credit line.

Even Mr. Wold

concedes that a deal was made:
14.

Affiant [Wold] told H. Clyde Davis that if

payment of $20,000.00 was received for the month of
June, (A) additional monthly payments to U.S. Bancorp
of at least "interest only" would have to be made
monthly to U.S. Bancorp, (B)

monthly payments to

HUD would have to be kept current, and (C) the
credit line would still have to be paid off.
R. 81.
17

The fact finder would have to determine the meaning of the
words used in Mr. Wold's deposition and particularly the meaning
of "paid-off within a reasonable period of time and that U.S.
Bancorp would

"work with" the Davis while the credit line was

being paid off (R. 80). The facts established by the Plaintiffs'
testimony and that of H. Clyde Davis was that the payment was
made to solve any complaints of U.S. Bancorp and based upon the
representation

that

the

credit

line, up

to

$50,000.00

would

continue to be available.
A fact finder could easily determine that the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant H. Clyde Davis acted reasonably in paying the money
and

were

ignorant

of

any

falsity

attached

to

Mr.

Wold's

representations.
As a result of the Plaintiffs reliance, they were damaged.
They lost the source of funds from which to make the monthly
payments

to

the

Defendant

addition,

the

Plaintiffs

delinquent

and allowed

and

to

loan

prevent

with

the Defendant

the

foreclosure.
Defendant

In

became

the basis upon which

to

foreclose.
The Appellees again contend that the Appellants could not
prove

damages

(Appellees'

arising

brief

at

out
20).

of

the

As

claimed

misrepresentation

demonstrated

throughout

the

pleadings and briefs, the largest item of damage suffered by the
Plaintiffs was the foreclosure of their home and property given
as security for the credit line and the inability to discharge
the loan by regular monthly payments.
18

That element

alone is

sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs recognized that prior counsel for
Plaintiffs may have been dilatory in establishing the ancillary
damages

alleged

in the complaint consisting

of

post-traumatic

stress syndrome, lost wages and other required items.

However,

the Defendants have maintained throughout that the conduct of the
Plaintiffs precludes the foreclosure of the property (R. 449-457,
R. 14-28; 57-67).
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
SLANDER OF TITLE
A.

The Elements for Slander of Title.

The Appellees do not dispute the four elements constituting
Slander of Title.
oral

or

written,

First, there must be a publication, either
of

a slanderous

statement.

A

slanderous

statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal
validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or
hypothecate the property; Second, the statement must be false;
Third, the statement must have been made with malice; and, Fourth
the

statement

must

cause

actual

or

special

damages

to

the

Plaintiff.
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d

566 (Utah

1988); Jack B. Parsons Cos. v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah
1988); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949).
B.

The Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case for
Slander of Title.

As it relates to the first element, Appellees still deny
that the foreclosure was published.
19

Utah Code Annotated 57-1-25

(1989

as Amended) provides

that the notice of sale must be

published three times in a newspaper of general circulation and
by posting notice of the same on the property and also in at
least three public places.

The Defendants do not seriously argue

that the foreclosure was not completed

and in fact notice of

various sales was published numerous times.

It was the setting

of the sale, pursuant to the trust deed that prompted the motions
for preliminary injunction (R. 15-28).
Appellees

then

argue

that

the

filing

of

a

wrongful

foreclosure is privileged, to the same extent as a lis pendens
(Appellees 1

brief

at

26).

The

commencement

of

a

wrongful

foreclosure and the posting of a notice of sale is not protected.
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d

566

(Utah

1988); Jack B. Parson Co., v. Nield, supra.
It is important to note that the Plaintiffs do not contend
that the notice of default alone constituted a slander of title.
Rather,

the notice of the trustee's

sale based upon wrongful

foreclosure constitutes the slander of title.
Finally, Appellees claim that the Plaintiffs have failed to
establish damages.

The Plaintiffs were required to initiate this

action to both stop the foreclosure and remove the lien created
by the foreclosure
The

Complaint

attorney fees.

from the property

and Amended

(R. 1-28, 37-50,

Complaint both request

57-64).

an award of

Inasmuch as attorney fees were expended to remove

the cloud from the Plaintiffs' and the Defendant H. Clyde Davis'
title, the attorney fees constitute the special damages required
20

to make a prima facie case for slander of title. Bass,, supra.
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
DEFAMATION.
The

Appellees

do

not

address

the

substance

of

the

Plaintiffs' cause of action for Defamation (Appellees' brief at
26-29).

Although included in the title of the Point, there is

no refutation to the argument made in the Appellants' original
brief.
The Plaintiffs contend that the court granted the motion for
summary judgment on the basis that "the court has not been given
any evidence of publication of alleged defamatory comments."
549-550).

Appellees

contended

at trial

that

the

(R.

Plaintiffs

failed to establish any damage.
Unlike slander of title, the tort of liable and slander are
personal torts.

Personal torts may be based on tangible and

intangible losses and give rise to presumed general and special
damages.

Bass

v.

Planned

Management

Services,

supra.

Accordingly damages are not relevant and were not used as a basis
in deciding

summary judgment

as it relates to the Defamation

cause of action.
There is no question in the case law that the imputation of
indebtedness or delinquency in paying ones debts is libellous.
Reed v. Melnick, 471 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1970); Hinkle v. Alexander,
411 P.2d 829 (Or. 1966); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288
(Ala.

1983).

foreclosure

Certainly

in this case, the commencement

action without

any right

21

is

libelous

of a

in that it

inasmuch

as

its

fair

meaning

is

that

the

Plaintiffs

are

delinquent and are unable to pay their debts.
As it relates to the claim that there was no publication,
the

pleadings

established

by

establish

the

requisite

the pleadings

issues

of

fact.

and Utah Code Annotated

As

57-1-31

(1985 as Amended), the Notice of Sale must be published at least
three

times, once

a week

for

three

consecutive

weeks

in a

newspaper having a general circulation in the county in which the
property is to be located.

Additionally, the Notice of Sale must

be posted on the property to be sold and also in at least three
public

places

located.

of

the

city

or

Utah Code Annotated

county
57-1-25

where

the

property

(1989 as Amended).

is
In

light of the clear public filings and posting, there is clear
evidence in the record that the libelous statements were in fact
published

and

the

court

committed

error

in granting

summary

judgment.
POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION.
Appellees sole rebuttal to the Plaintiffs1 contention that
the court erroneously granted summary judgment on the issue of
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is:
Even if U.S. Bancorp and its employees knew of the
Appellants' mental frailties, there was no
evidence that the action to foreclose the real
property was anything but lawful.
Appellees' brief at 25.
22

As established time and time again, there is considerable
question as to whether the foreclosure was lawfully commenced.
The Plaintiffs have established that Chris Wold, an authorized
agent of the Defendants, explicitly agreed with the Plaintiffs
that upon the payment of $20,000.00, no foreclosure would take
place and the Plaintiffs would have full rights to access the
credit line.
Additionally, the issue of whether or not the conduct of
U.S. Bancorp in commencing the foreclosure under the facts of
this case

constitutes

"extreme

and outrageous conduct," is a

question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder.

As stated by

the Court in Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of ME., Inc., 534 A.2d
1282

(ME.

1987),

the

issue

of

the

type

of

conduct

that

is

compensable, is best left to the jury.
Certainly, the facts of this case are not those typically
seen in a foreclosure action.

The agent and employees of the

Defendant lured the Plaintiffs into paying $20,000.00 and then
wrongfully commenced
the

agents

and

foreclosure.

employees

Plaintiffs were suffering

of

The Record establishes that

the

Defendant

from Post-Traumatic

knew

that

the

Stress Syndrome.

Further, the agents of the Defendant knew that they had promised
the Plaintiffs continued access to the credit line in order to
meet their regular monthly expenses and specifically the monthly
payments owing to the Defendant.

It is respectfully submitted

that any reasonable person would know that the total repudiation
of the agreement and the initiation of foreclosure
23

activities

with the posting of notices would cause persons suffering from
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome to suffer additional emotional and
physical harm.
POINT IX:

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES,

The court ruled that it would not allow the Defendants to
re-coup

attorney

fees incurred

alleged by the Plaintiffs.

in defending

against the torts

The court did allow the award of

attorney fees associated directly with the foreclosure action (R.
566-567, 568-571).
Plaintiffs have failed to find any case which allows the
recovery

of

fees

associated

tortious misconduct.
stand

with

defending

against

alleged

The cases cited by the Defendants do not

for that proposition

but

relate

only

incurred in associated contract questions.

to attorney

fees

Brown v. Richards,

840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d
856 (Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
This

Court

should reverse

the ruling of the trial

court

granting summary judgment in this case and deny the Defendants'
claim for attorney fees.
DATED this _5

day of May, 1995.
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